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interdependence feed off this political climate. Command-and-control economies are rejected for liberal free markets and prior Cold War rivals seek greater integration into the global economy. In the military arena, armed conflict between great powers is no longer the greatest threat to international peace and security. However, technological advances permit capabilities, previously reserved for great powers, to proliferate to lesser players. Life at President Bush's "crossroads of radicalism and technology" allows "weak" state and non-state actors to directly threaten the national security of the United States. 4 Exceptionalism is the most compelling factor of the domestic strategic culture and central to the domestic context towards confronting Iraq. The United States sees itself as an extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human affairs. Without a definitive threat in the 1990s, America often practiced Trevor McCrisken's "exemplary" strand of exceptionalism. Absent the driving force of Cold War superpower politics, the United States looked to cash in on the peace dividend, felt aloof from world troubles, and largely saw it sufficient to lead by example. 5 Emphasis on foreign aid plummeted and intervention, when deemed necessary, tolerated minimal costs.
September 11th was a watershed event that changed America's perception of foreign policy and its view of exceptionalism. The terrorist attacks ended a decade of foreign policy complacency where America believed foreign engagement was a matter of choice and not
necessity. In The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), President
Bush says basic freedoms hold "true for every person [and] every society" in a world where democracy and free enterprise form the "best foundations for domestic stability and international order." 6 Bush advocates a return to the "missionary" view of exceptionalism. It is not enough to lead by example. The United States must use its "unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence…to create a balance of power that favors human freedom."
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OPPORTUNITIES
September 11th also revealed the intersection of transnational and traditional threats and provided new opportunities for action. American awareness of its vulnerability to terrorism coupled with the ramifications of a growing WMD threat crystallized American national will to assume a leadership role in the Global War on Terrorism. President Bush's linkage of terrorists and countries that support terrorism blunted Iraq's effort to divide world opinion on sanctions and provided a springboard for further action.
The warming of U.S.-Russian relations since September 11th and the Bush Doctrine of unilateral action against imminent WMD threats have enabled political maneuvering room that was not available before the terrorist attacks. 8 Iraq had been able to flagrantly disregard 16 U.N.
resolutions, continue its WMD program, and not provoke a comprehensive U.N. response.
Bush's ability to rally world opinion about U.N. relevancy showed how far world opinion had moved since September 11th. The decision is no longer whether the world should confront Iraq but how it should confront Saddam's regime. 
THREAT
NATIONAL INTERESTS
America's vital national interests are defined within the context of international and domestic constraints, address the threat and opportunities of the times, and form the foundation for the ends to be pursued by strategy. Current vital national interests are summarized in the Bush NSS and reflect the changed strategic landscape in the post-September 11th world.
1. Champion aspirations for human dignity 2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends 3. Work with others to diffuse conflicts 4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction 5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade 6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy 7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power 8. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century 16 Not surprisingly, the post-September 11th NSS adds the defeat of global terrorism as a vital national interest. However, the NSS also adds increased emphasis to America's core values (universal freedoms, free enterprise, democracy) when compared to the July 2000 Commission on America's National Interests. Consistent with missionary exceptionalism, each core value is dedicated as a separate national interest. Finally, multilateralism is emphasized in dealing with global terrorism, the WMD threat, diffusing conflict, and other agendas for cooperative action.
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
The political objectives towards Iraq are congruent to the national interests. The six objectives shown below have been widely presented in presidential speeches, Congressional testimonies, and press interviews. The democratic aspect of the sixth objective is implied in numerous statements highlighting the entitlement of the Iraqi people to universal freedoms and self-government. 
FAILURE OF DETERRENCE AND CONTAINMENT
Deterrence and containment have been central to U.S. non-military strategy towards Iraq.
Effective deterrence requires adversary rationality, attribution, and a credible threat of retaliation.
A marriage of terrorism and Iraqi WMD capability puts effective deterrence at risk. Rationality falls apart when the adversary is unintentionally suicidal, prone to great miscalculations, and unchecked from abuses of power. 18 In the shadowy world of terrorism, attribution can be difficult. America is still trying to "connect the dots" for the September 11th attacks and determine the level of complicity and support of Iraq to Al-Qaeda. Finally, retaliation means little to terrorists whose passion and hatred breed personal indifference to death. relevancy was a good first step. The U.S. must continue to press Russia, China, and France for Security Council approval of coercive inspections. In these negotiations, the U.S. maintains a strong position for establishing a new system of inspections. Russia, China, and France do not want to become isolated from the international community over Iraq and want to keep the world's lone superpower engaged in the international political system. China and Russia also do not want to endanger strengthening ties with the U.S. on their own critical domestic issues. 22 The U.S. must also press diplomatic initiatives with regional actors. Towards this end, Iraq will aim to weather the initial assault. Subsequently, Iraq will prolong the war to such an extent that coalition costs, terrorism priorities, and Islamic unrest will, separately or in combination, pressure Washington into a negotiated settlement.
Besides American exceptionalism and vulnerability viewed in the light of September 11th, the cost of eliminating the threat now outweighs the risk of dealing with a nuclear-armed Saddam later. From the U.S. perspective, the coalition has a proven track record of gaining low-cost military solutions. To achieve the political objectives at an acceptable cost, the coalition must quickly eliminate the Iraqi regime as a functional command structure while minimizing any WMD response and maintaining control of the occupied territory. Attacks against field forces are targeted to precipitate cascading demoralization, ineffective resistance, and eventually mass capitulation.
MILITARY STRATEGIC SETTING
The military strategic setting is determined by the assumed conduct and character of war and the constraints imposed on military operations. The key assumption inherent to military intervention is that Iraq does not possess nuclear weapons or a combination of weaponized biological agents and delivery systems that could achieve nuclear-like lethalities. This assumption does not eliminate a lesser Iraqi WMD capability. Consequently, the predominant conduct of the war will be conventional with possible Iraqi escalation to WMD. The conduct of war will be a U.S.-led coalition versus an isolated Iraq. Although the composition of the coalition and specific member state contributions are unknown, Cordesman is confident that the U.S. will gain the regional support it needs for theater ports of disembarkation, staging, logistics, and force basing. Iraq, on the other hand, will not receive any direct support from neighboring countries or the Arab world. The most support it can expect is "sympathetic but largely insincere political rhetoric." Iraq's air force, air defense forces, and naval forces also suffered in the last decade. Iraq's air force can only maintain 300 combat aircraft in limited operational status. Scripted, unrealistic training hinders initiative and relies on centralized ground control. Iraq's air defense network is still one of the most extensive systems in the world but has been limited to optical tracking and shoot-and-scoot tactics. A decade of no-fly zone confrontations has improved Iraqi air defense decoy and deception efforts but has not resulted in the downing of a single coalition aircraft. 33 Finally, Iraq's navy was not rebuilt after the Gulf War. Naval defenses are limited to shorebased anti-ship missiles and a large stockpile of naval mines. 34 Discussed earlier, Iraq's unconventional capabilities point to a rebuilt and expanding WMD program. These forces pose a significant threat but will not achieving nuclear-like lethalities in the near future. CIA assessments for delivery vehicles include a few dozen ballistic missiles and UAV/support aircraft prototypes from several development programs. These advantages show that the size of coalition forces is limited by basing, deployment, and support constraints and not by capability. Unlike 1990, the U.S. maintains substantial prepositioned equipment, robust air power assets, and considerable infrastructure in theater. The majority of these assets must remain available to coalition forces to mount a viable military strategy.
Military vulnerabilities remain remarkably unchanged a decade after Desert Storm. High tempo, parallel operations favor coalition forces and expose Iraq to mass military defections and public revolt in the face of decisive defeat. Protracted, sequential operations favor a centralized Iraqi force looking to impact U.S. resolve and force a negotiated settlement. Best stated by Liddell Hart, "the chief incalculable [in war] is the human will, which manifests itself in resistance." 36 A modern application of Liddell Hart's indirect approach can best shape the variability of will on both sides. As a strategic concept, the indirect approach can exploit coalition advantages, diminish the possibility of Iraqi resistance, and protect U.S. resolve.
STRATEGIC CONCEPT
Liddell Hart said, "dislocation is the aim of strategy." 37 More specifically, strategy leverages maneuver and surprise in an indirect approach to synergize physical and psychological dislocation. In Desert Storm, dislocation required deployment of 500,000 troops, a five-week air campaign and a massive ground assault involving nine divisions. 38 The U.S. cannot expect the luxury of such overwhelming numbers for this campaign. With survival at stake, Saddam will have every incentive to use chemical and biological weapons at ports of disembarkation and staging areas. Saddam also knows that he cannot win a set-piece desert battle. Saddam is likely to withdraw elite Republican Guard units to defend the cities, especially Baghdad and Tikrit, and fight a protracted war of attrition. These new challenges require a new strategy to gain dislocation. A synchronized, near-simultaneous, two-phase campaign emphasizing air power, fast-moving armored ground forces, and special operations can achieve our military objectives and minimize vulnerabilities.
The overarching philosophy present in this new strategy is to foster a war of liberation where the government and not the country is the focus of attack. As such, an aggressive psychological campaign must be waged to encourage Iraqi public support, guarantee Iraqi officers a role in transforming Iraq, and to deter use of WMD. Infrastructure targets should be spared to blunt increased public support for Saddam Hussein under a "rally around the flag" mentality and to enable nation-building at the end of the campaign.
The likelihood of a pre-emptive WMD attack during force deployments drives an "optimal force" strategy versus an "overwhelming force" strategy. Accepting the risk of a smaller force allows quicker deployments, smaller staging areas, and increased pre-positioning of equipment in theater. Coalition force deployments can also be distributed across the theater to deny mass targets inside ballistic missile range or to remain outside of missile range completely. These measures collectively can preserve operational surprise with a widely dispersed, relatively small force that can be reinforced quickly.
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The opening phase of the war will embrace Liddell Hart's "dispersed strategic advance" to paralyze enemy action rather than crushing his forces. 40 Hundreds of fighters, bombers, and cruise missiles will strike targets sets tied to all of the military objectives, save peace enforcement, in an intensive, parallel assault. Offensive counter air will suppress and destroy the enemy air defense network, disable Iraqi airfields, and destroy Iraqi fighters. Strategic attacks on Iraqi headquarters and their C3 network will isolate fielded forces from centralized control and blind Iraqi leaders on the condition of their forces and the status of their country. Synchronized special operations and air attacks will locate and destroy mobile missile launchers and other NBC infrastructure. Massive, coordinated air strikes will target concentrations of elite Republican Guard units in their assembly areas before they have an opportunity to move into, and try to hide in, population centers. Presidential palaces, secret police facilities, intelligence centers, and other regime targets will be struck to sever Saddam from the trappings of power.
The ground campaign ensures the dislocation manifested in the parallel air campaign becomes permanent. The main effort, encompassing 2-3 divisions of armor and mechanized infantry, will press towards Baghdad from the south. A supporting force, including elements of an airborne division and special forces will stage out of Northern Iraq with Kurdish support.
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Despite the campaign emphasis on dislocation, the biggest unknown is the level of resistance in the cities. In the race for Baghdad, secondary urban areas can initially be isolated and bypassed while still trying to influence enemy forces to surrender. Ultimately, ground forces must be prepared to maintain the initiative and conduct urban warfare to force capitulation.
This ground force is not sized to blunt a determined Iraqi ground offensive. Although not likely, Saddam's most dangerous course of action is a pre-emptive ground offensive, directly supported by WMD, before or during the deployment phase. If air power cannot blunt the offensive, ground forces may be unable to maintain a lengthy defense. A reserve army division and additional air power must be ready to deploy and reinforce such a contingency.
POTENTIAL RESULTS
After a decade of sanctions, inspections, and interventions, Iraq has little ability to defeat a determined military assault. This strategic concept can defeat Iraq and force a regime change. In the short term, the demise of Saddam will ensure full WMD disarmament, end state-sponsored terrorism, and enable Iraqi compliance to all other U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Longterm peacekeeping efforts and nation-building programs are required to foster democratic and free market institutions, to prevent disintegration along ethnic and religious lines, and to ensure peace and prosperity in the Persian Gulf. The risk to coalition forces will be high. With survival at stake, Saddam will likely resort to WMD in his defense. If the international community does not act, the costs will be higher. In backing down to Iraq, other nations will see that a credible threat of chemical or biological attack deterred U.S. action. Nations that pursue weapons of terror should feel less secure, not more.
Even worse, Iraq on its present course will gain a nuclear capability. If we do not ensure disarmament now, the cost of intervention against a nuclear Iraq will be much higher. Today, the risks of acting, either by inspections or military intervention, are far less than waiting for a proven nuclear capability.
